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Abstract 
 
Worldwide, but in particular in North America and Europe, the grid infrastructure managers are 
facing demands for reinvestments in new assets with higher on-grid and off-grid functionality in 
order to promote energy efficiency and low-carbon conversion of the energy sector. To meet 
societal policy objectives in terms of carbon dioxide emissions, both the composition of the 
generators in favor of distributed energy resources (DER) and the load, promoting integration 
with downstream energy useage, will change. In this paper, we chararcterize some of the effects 
of new asset investments policy on the network tasks, assets and costs and contrast this with the 
assumptions implicit or explicit in current economic network regulation. The resulting challenge 
is identified as the change in the direction of higher asymmetry of information and higher capital 
intensity, combined with ambiguities in terms of task separation. To provide guidance, we present 
a model of investment provision under regulation between a distribution system operator (DSO) 
and a potential investor-generation. The results from the model confirm the hypothesis that 
network regulation should find a focal point, should integrate externalities in the performance 
assessment and should avoid wide delegation of contracting-billing for smart-grid investments. 
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1 Introduction
Climate change policy in the post-Kyoto world has deep repercussions on the
way we extract, produce, transport and consume natural resources in every-
day life. Achieving a common aggregate goal by e¤orts in multiple countries,
sectors and over generations is itself a daunting task for the worlds govern-
ments, doing under uncertainty about the optimal path to achieve the target
or even consensus about the strategic arbitrage between intertemporal wel-
fare and nal environmental state is even worse. In this paper, we highlight
a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for the deployment of an e¤ective
climate change policy in practice: the coordination of energy network regu-
lation.
By focusing at the regulation of the network, rather than the energy
or services performed on the infrastructure, we intentionally abstract from
highly relevant but methodologically di¤erent questions related to the de-
mand and supply for energy, market e¢ ciency and power. Further, the
limitation to energy infrastructure regulation rather than the more general
utility regulation also excludes interesting and challenging problems occur-
ring in countries and jurisdictions with vertically integrated utilities, under
electrication or with state-owned incumbents in generation. Finally, we
primarily base the discussion on the most mature and widespread energy in-
frastructure: electricity grids, with some attention also given to gas network
regulation. However, with an eye on particularly the European political and
regulatory situation, we hope to show that [energy] network regulation as
it is practiced currently is not adequate to support a climate change policy,
neither in terms on dominant theoretical support, nor in terms of regulatory
practice. Although our concern is based on primarily theoretical arguments,
we believe that the ndings are of applied relevance as well.
The outline is as follows: First we briey resume the theoretical under-
pinnings of recent past and current network regulation paradigms, review-
ing also their links to the standard "packages" frequently used in regulatory
practice. Second, we contrast the "old world" assumptions for regulation
with the particular technical and economical challenges brought by a likely
implementation of climate change policy onto the electricity sector. Third,
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we review the e¤ectiveness of the models previously cited in the case of cli-
mate change, drawing conclusions about some areas of concern. Fourth, we
propose two theoretical streams of analysis that have not received su¢ cient
attention, but that may be informative to the designers of the "new world"
network regulation. Finally, we close the paper with some remarks about
the feasibility of the changes and the seriousness of the problems identied.
1.1 Network operations in the climate change setting
There is some consensus as to the list of e¤ects on network operations in a
low-carbon future, although the quantitative estimation of their importance
still needs more precision.
Pepermans et al. (2005) list as driving forces for DG introduction exi-
ble and diversied energy services, such as (i) standby or peak use capacity
(peak shaving), (ii) reliability and power quality, (iii) substitute for invest-
ments in grid expansion, (iv) ancillary services, and environmental concerns,
i.e. (v) cogeneration CHP, and (vi) e¢ cient use of inexpensive1 energy re-
sources. The policy issues are summarized as (i) high nancial cost, (ii)
limited choices of primary fuels, (iii) lower economic e¢ ciency (primarily
allocative e¢ ciency), (iv) ine¢ cient fuel utilization from an environmen-
tal viewpoint, (v) lower supply security, (vi) mixed power quality (system
frequency, voltage level, change in power ow, reduced e¤ectiveness of pro-
tection equipment, reactive power, power conditioning).
The reduction of carbon emissions is result of three complementary ac-
tions on the supply side: changes in fuel mix, shifts in generation technology
and carbon capture and storage (CCS). We leave the latter part until the
last section, thus addressing the decarbonization of the electricity sector
through fuel and technology mix. The fuel choices are to be guided through
an appropriate implementation of pricing mechanisms for the externalities
related to CO2-emissions, such as ETS or equivalent, which lie beyond the
scope of network regulation. The electricity generation park is planned to
be extended substantially with renewable energy resources (RES), primarily
wind, tidal power, biomass and photovoltaic (PV) generation, cf. EC (2007,
2009). The greatest absolute and relative increase among RES is found for
windpower from 82 TWh produced in 2006 to 545 TWh planned2 in 2020
EC(2007). The new RES will be smaller units than the current centralized
plants as a consequence of exhausted locations, local NIMBY resistance, di-
1Note that the energy sources often are free (solar energy, tidal, wind) or even negatively
priced (waste, industrial heat).
2Green-X model, least cost scenario in EC(2007).
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minishing returns in resource availability and lower economies of scale for
certain technologies. In particular for wind and solar, the lions part of the
increase will be made as distributed generation (DG), i.e. installations below
100 MW connected directly to the distribution network. For photovoltaic
in Europe with the exception of Spain and Portugal, the installations are
residential micro-generators connected directly to the low-voltage grid and
used mainly for autoconsumption.
The load in the low-carbon power system is partially controlled by demand-
side management (DSM) mechanisms that control interruptible loads, sched-
ule consumption and charge local energy storages (vehicles, heat storage)
with respect to local DG availability, real-time price signals from the retail-
ers/DSO and local demand signals. In combination with energy e¢ ciency
applied to both residential, commercial and industrial load, the overall en-
ergy volume transported per customer is expected to decrease. However,
with continued expansion of total power for household and commercial ap-
pliances, the peak load is likely not decreasing, or at least less than the total
energy consumption.
In combination with the high increase in intermittent DER generation
needing backup through generation or grid interconnection, the increased
share of non-coincidental peak generation and the introduction of wide
demand-side participation also in generation and power services, the net-
work investment need is substantial,
The new RES Directive (EC 2009/29) explicitly stipulates (art 16:3 and
5) that electricity TSO and DSO are obliged to disclose cost and benet
analyses with respect to the connection of RES and that the residual costs
are either shared among grid users (art 6) with respect to a objective, trans-
parent and nondiscriminatory criteria (without stating those), or absorbed
by the network operator (art 4).
2 Network regulation in the old world
The guiding principle for all economic activity in the Western society is the
market. Network operations, such as distribution of electricity or gas, are
examples of natural monopolies or market failures. For electricity distribu-
tion, the monopoly is accentuated by (i) the existence of a single supplier of
the service for each customer, (ii) no substitute for the o¤ered service and
very low price elasticity, and (iii) high economic and legal barriers to mar-
ket entry due to the asset-specicity and its essential importance for societal
welfare. Without non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure, the oper-
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ators potential rent extraction could distort incentives for generator invest-
ments, retail competition and market e¢ ciency, leading to losses in alloca-
tive e¢ ciency. Without vertical separation, the network operator-generator
could moreover directly distort competition by not only distorting access
to information and infrastructure, but potentially also cross-subsidizing the
competitive business by the monopoly operations.
In addition to the desire to incite productive and allocative e¢ ciency,
there are also non-economic reasons to impose regulation on a network in-
dustry. Attention paid to public safety, continuity of supply, public service
obligations, national independence and information disclosure and integrity
are examples of such objectives.
Thus, in return for granting exclusive monopoly rights, for a limited or
unlimited period of time, the society empowers a regulator to act as a proxy
purchaser of the service, imposing constraints on the revenues, prices and/or
the modalities of the production.
Early regulatory theory largely ignored incentive and information issues,
heavily drawing on conventional wisdom and industry studies. The kind of
institutional regulatory economics that Bonbright (1962) and Philips (1969)
represented was challenged already in the seventies with economists as Fried-
man, Baumol, Demsetz (1968) and Williamson (1976) questioning the or-
ganization and succession of natural monopolies. However, the main break-
through came in the late eighties with information economics and agency
theory (Holmström, La¤ont, Tirole). An authoritative reading in the area
is La¤ont and Tirole (1993). Contemporary economic theory pursues the
private goals and strategic behavior of the individual agent, with particular
emphasis at the access, cost and use of information. The practical applica-
tions from this stream of research have had a profound impact on modern
markets, market instruments, contracts and economic restructuring. An in-
teresting tendency in the discussion of the challenges facing infrastructure
is to revert to non-market solutions (feed-in tari¤s, priority dispatch, in-
vestment subsidies, connection privileges etc) to accelerate or, in general,
implement low-carbon technologies. As we will argue, in agreement with
Pollitt (2009), these "intuitive" solutions are not only philosophically incon-
sistent with the market paradigm, they also increase complexity for actors,
regulatory uncertainty and sometimes imply distortions on both allocative
and technical e¢ ciency. The current regulatory "package" in Europe is then
constituted primarily of periodically reviewed high-powered regimes with
partial performance assessment (mainly cost e¢ ciency), rules for modus
operandi (non-discrimination in access etc) and a set of institutional guide-
lines with respect to the information disclosure, organization and ownership
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of the regulated rms. Its e¤ectiveness depends on the tasks and external-
ities it is supposed to control, past performance is only representative of
future success insofar as these are of equivalent nature
2.1 Information access, task separability, independence and
externalities
The properties of high-powered (incentive) network regulation depend on a
number of factors, most importantly the asymmetry on cost information,
task separability, role of independence and externalities.
Given that the demand for network connection is virtually inelastic, at
least for electricity, the natural orientation of the regulatory policy since
deregulation has been to induce cost e¢ ciency to limit monopoly rents from
the DSOs. For TSOs, the task scope already included a number of elements
with high externalities and cascade e¤ects on welfare, such as the invest-
ments in market facilitation and security of supply in general, prompting
the regulators to impose relatively low-powered initial regimes for CAPEX
and OPEX (Moens, 2009).
First, the cost information in a yardstick regime is related to access to
a reference set of cost observations for structurally comparable operators
(Agrell et al., 2005). For DSO, this condition is largely met in jurisdictions
such as Germany (Agrell and Bogetoft, 2007), or Scandinavia (Agrell and
Bogetoft, 2010) where data standardization and collection permit the use
of econometric non-parametric models to calculate e¢ cient costs with rela-
tively high precision. For jurisdictions with a smaller number of operators,
international datasets may potentially be used after correcting for cost and
operating di¤erences. However, the assumption of comparability relies on
the previous assumption that tasks and cost drivers are uniformly applied
across units, which limits the use of international data in an uncoordinated
future.
Second, the current regulatory paradigm relies on high task separability
between regulated segments. In the pre-Kyoto world of central generation
and loosely interconnected systems, primarily for the purpose of supply se-
curity, the main network services are characterized by relatively high separa-
bility between the two vertical segments under regulation in the EU frame-
work: distribution and transmission. The transmission system operator
(TSO) is distinguished from the distributors (DSO) both in terms of scope
of task (power system responsability vs local supply services), but also in
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terms of asset base (normally 220-380 kV vs 0.4-110 kV, respectively)3. The
distribution networks, once unbundled from the retail operations, consti-
tute mainly of radial passive networks with exogenously given feed-in points
(substations from TSO). As will be discussed below, there is a certain con-
census that the tasks related to transition towards low-carbon technologies
will challenge this separability in that DSOs will be forced to replicate TSO-
type tasks at lower grid levels, becoming active grid units with sophisticated
local information systems and potentially even localized price information.
Another challenge for task separability is the necessity to coordinate tech-
nical research and development activities in order to achieve e¤ective and
interoperable solutions to attract investments at the generation stage. Al-
though assigned as an explict responsability for the TSOs (ENTSO-E tasks,
Art 8 § 3a and § 5, EC 714/2009), we note that both regulators (OFGEM
and NMa/EK) as well as DSO associations (Eurelectric) are implementing
support schemes for DSO R&D.
Third, independence has been implemented primarily through unbundling
of accounts for DSO, ownership unbundling only for TSOs to counter mar-
ket power in generation. In the pre-Kyoto world, this could be a su¢ cently
e¤ective arrangement, since the unbundling guarantees information access
for the DSO regulation and safeguards the central generation market, both
corresponding to regulatory means to achieve welfare goals. Once again,
the massive increase of decentralized generation, demand side management
measures and more information intensive use of the distribution neworks
changes the prerequisites for the analysis. Owners of DSO may now become
major players in the growing renewables segment, with superior information
about the benets and costs of using the network, raising concerns about
the objectivity of e.g. localized connection charges and equal access. This
paper will explicitly investigate this issue with respect to investment incen-
tives, but we will ignore the subsequent question on how market power in
the DG retail market might be exercised.
Fourth, the externalities in the "old" world were mainly related to the
TSO operations, both in terms of market functioning and environmental im-
pact. The new situation, foreseeing wide integration of generation and load
control in distribution will put the environmental externalities (CO2, space,
noice, heat) in the focus of the DSO. Without adequate means of internal-
izing part of these externalities, it is clear that the DSO will be lukewarm
concerning investments and reluctant to carry regulatory and business risk.
3The Scandinavian introduction of a third regulated level, the regional transmission
operator (RTO) operating primarily transport services at 110-220 kV is unique.
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2.2 Innovation and development activities
The radical change of the role, technology and business models for gen-
eration, distribution, transmission and load control is prompting for more
than incremental development, if the tight timeframe is to be respected
step-changes are likely to be necessary. However, The reduction of industry-
nanced R&D since the unbundling of network services and generation is
signicant with very few exceptions. Sterlacchini (2010) show that the R&D
intensity in the sector worldwide decreased by 44% in proportion to sales
(26% in absolute terms) during the period 2000 - 2007. For Europe, the
gures are even more negative, -49% (R&D/sales) for all rms and -67%
(R&D/sales) for a sample of the four largest private European rms (Enel,
EDF, RWE, and Suez). However, only two countries in Europe provided
explicit innovation or research incentives for DSOs in 2008 (Cossent et al.,
2009). Jamasb and Pollitt (2008) provide a systemic analysis of the decline
in research expenditure and nds it consistent with predictions taking into
account privatization e¤ects, competition and regulatory focus on cost ef-
ciency. Although they note an increase in R&D productivity, they warn
about the long-term consequences from the reduced overall R&D intensity.
As mentioned above, the European Commission has taken the lag in
R&D intensity seriously enough to create a "regulatory push" through the
ENTSO-E obligation to perform certain research and the provision to pass-
through the related costs. However, given the economies of scale involved in
the system R&D concerned and the importance of creating open standards
and protocols for the technologies involved in the climate change energy
sector, the provision relies also on the regulatory counterpart, the Agency
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators4 (ACER), being able to monitor
and incite e¤ective and e¢ cient use of the raised funds. It is puzzling that
the previous R&D output was translated in such meager productivity im-
provements prior to deregulation, serving also as reminder to question the
relationship between R&D expenditure and technological progress.
3 Review of recent work on network regulation for
climate change policy
Brunekreeft and Ehlers (2005) adress specically the problem whether the
unbundling of DSO changes the incentives for DG integration. One of their
contributions is to introduce the temporal (short-run vs. long-run) per-
4Cf. Regulation EC 713/2009 of 13 July 2009.
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spective, questioning whether the DSOs are likely to experience reductions
in network losses, as opposed to TSOs. Arguing that even high-powered
regimes such as price- and revenue-caps for DSO in reality are regularly
reset based partially on CAPEX estimates, the authors conclude that the
DSO unbundling and incentive regulation are likely both to distort the tim-
ing, volume and types of DG investments made by DSOs. The results are
compared to actual investment intensity among DSOs and the slow response
to coordinated incentives DG-DSO.
Pollitt (2008) discusses the prospects for future network regulation, based
on an ex post analysis of the UK regulatory development. Noting that most
investments at both the electricity DSO and TSO level are driven by RES
support schemes (such as Renewables Obligation Certicates, ROC, and the
Transmission Investment for Renewable Generation, TIRG), Pollitt foresees
general increases in electricity prices of about 10-15%. For the UK, the
Stern review foresees a total investment need of 1% of GDP to meet carbon
emission targets by 2050, thereof around 4,000 MGBP for the electricity
sector resulting in a 80% reduction of the CO2 emissions by 2050. The es-
tablishment of the O¢ ce of Climate Change (OCC) in the UK must be seen
as a rare and welcome sign of committment from the political principals
with respect to the climate change target policy, following a period of high
uncertainty and slow progress from a very low level of RES penetration.
In his prospective analysis of the requirements for new network regulation,
Pollitt highlights four points: (1) maintenance of the key learnings from the
liberalized energy market, (2) increased process focus in regulation, lower
emphasis on enduser prices as indicator of regulatory e¤ectiveness, (3) fo-
cus at the economic realization of climate change policy measures, such as
interventions, pilot projects and support schemes, (4) e¤ective mangement
of regulatory and market risk through more sophisticated risk transfer in-
struments. Specically, Pollitt outlines a new regulatory model with three
elements:
First, delegation of investment decisions to negotiated settlements be-
tween grid operators and users. This change in the direction of output-
based regulation transforms the relationship between the network operator
and the regulator from ex ante centralized bargaining to ex post auditing.
Positive experiences within OFGEM for gas distribution prices and a series
of international experiences analyzed by Littlechild (e.g Littlechild, 2002
and Littlechild and Skerk, 2008) using negotiated access prices, investment
decisions and quality norms support this argument.
Second, more extensive promotion of competition on the grid and for
its expansion (tendered expansion). By carefully reviewing explicit and
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implicit barriers to entry as well as strengthen the ownership unbundling
requirements down to DSO level, emerging competition may be facilited for
generation, energy services and heat networks.
Third, Pollitt discusses the lead role of the regulator in the climate
change setting to make e¤ective internalization of the CO2 externalities,
such as in the case of investmen discounting (Weitzman, 2008), essentially
acting as to assure the most economic implementation of the environmental
externalities desired.
Woodman and Baker (2008) review the UK policy on DER, conclud-
ing that the current regulatory framework has been conceived to promote
competition within a given energy resource, rather than the development
of a more system response to socio-environmental objectives that could be
addressed with DER. The recommendations for regulation focus at the re-
moval of investment and connection barriers for DER, increased incentives
for DSO participation through higher costs for losses and some alignment
mechanism for investors-DSO investment decisions.
Green (2009) analyses the requirements for network regulation for three
types of systems (or scopes of deregulation); retail competition (as in EU),
wholesale competition (as in US and Latin America) and integrated rms
(potentially nationalized, e.g. the situation in France prior to 2005). Argu-
ing that the low-carbon policy will give rise to higher capital expenditure
per energy unit delivered, through remote locations, intermittent generation
and non-coinciding peaks in load and generation for renewables
Cossent et al. (2009) presents a thorough review of the state of actual
national network regulation of DG in Europe and proceeds to give some
regulatory recommendations. The recommendations include measures to
provide economic signals for DG investors and instruments to be used in
DSO network regulation. To provide e¢ cient investment signals, Cossent el
al. (2009) propose shallow connection charges and variable use of system
(UoS) charges that are location-dependent, technology-dependent and cost-
benet reective for the DGs impact on the DSO. Although the intention
is to bring DSO-regulation closer to that of current TSO-regulation, includ-
ing the strict unbundling from DGs, the recommendations are stay concep-
tual and urge for further research and development. In terms of network
regulation, besides restating support for high-powered incentive regulation
including the use of network service targets, the authors propose the ex ante
allocation of investment budgets to DSOs with full delegation of the use
of the funds. Ex post, the regulator should receive veriable information
about whether the investment has been carried out. The idea behind this
proposal is to provide "policy push" from the regulator without the draw-
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back of heavy-handed involvement in rm management. One of the model
features in this paper investigates this regime. To promote investments in
R&D by DSOs, Cossent et al. (2009) propose several possible means, such
as activation with higher rates of return, partial pass-through of R&D ex-
penses and mechanisms to allow capture of e¢ ciency gains from innovations
during longer (several) regulatory periods.
Vogel (2009), analyzing the investment incentives for DG of high- and
low-powered regimes, argues for deep connection charges as to avoid distor-
tions up- and downstreams in the chain. However, the nal conclusion is
negative when taking into account monopoly power of the DSO, asymmetric
information of cost and asset utilization, as well as the intrinsic di¢ culty to
commit to "true" high-powered regimes without glancing at the asset base.
Vogel (2009) concludes in this context that "due to technical complexity of
distribution grids and the manifold information asymmetries between the in-
volved stakeholders, a propoer design of deep charges will be very challenging
to implement in to reality." The explicit instruction in the RES Directive to
use shallow costs can then be seen as a recourse to a second-best solution in
light of the problem.
Boot and van Bree (2010) reports on a wide range of policy issues related
to a zero-carbon target in 2050, among those infrastructure for electricity.
The authors higlight the investment consequence of low-carbon transitions
into DSO networks that originally are constructed as passive networks. The
role of new regulation in the view of Boot and van Bree (2010) is extended to
issues such as locational pricing (also for DSO), long-term investment provi-
sions, metering standards and innovation support. One approach forwarded
in their report is the "negotiated settlement" proposed in Pollit (2009).
4 Conjecture
We have argued, with some support from the rich litterature on network
regulation for low-carbon power systems, that the current paradigm will be
partially outdated in the new world. However, rather than arguing along the
classical Williamson range of hierarchy versus market as coordination instru-
ment, we forward a relatively neglected stream of litterature that could help
inform the theoretical foundation for future network regulation. Departing
from the classical dyadic view of regulation as a two-party interaction (ei-
ther regulator - rm or government - investor), the analysis above suggests
that the old vertical separations between regulated segments, generation
and load will be fuzzy and under continuous re in the future. TSOs will
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need to understand DSO interactions, DSOs will need to operate local level
control systems, intelligent load and distributed generation will call on both
to control supply and demand of energy. Theoretically, the increased task
complexity and asymmetry of information call for analysis of the interac-
tion among the agents as a team rather than individually. Setting targets
collectively increases the scope and probability that externalities can be ex-
ploited within the team, delegating the actions to the agents. Team theory
also facilitates the analysis for collusive agreements among agents at various
levels, both in terms of side-payments (market arrangements) and in terms
of e¤ort minimization. Indeed, the analysis of the collective team may also
extend beyond the conventional frame rm-regulator and open interesting
insights into the interaction and optimal organization of the multi-lateral
regulatory structure itself.
Adopting the idea that network regulation may need to reconsider the
boundaries and anticipate the overall e¤ectiveness of a given policy for a
societal goal, does not necessarily imply an abandon of the market as the
governing principle for the energy sector also in the future. However, it does
suggest that the organization and delegation of tasks to specic agents may
be as important as the upfront monetary incentives o¤ered to the agents
themselves. This perspective is not very represented in the litterature, with
a notable exception of Joskow and Tirole (2005)
The rest of this paper contributes to the analysis of the future network
regulation by deploying a simple, stylized model of joint investment un-
der asymmetric information to explore the policy proposals forwarded with
various arguments above. Jelovac and Macho-Stradler (2002) uses a more
general formulation (of the complementary case) below. They assume that
there is a probability function depending on the investment levels of high
values being generated, and worked with complements in the sense that the
probability function is increasing, concave and with positive cross derivates.
In the model below, rst developed in Agrell and Bogetoft (2006), we assume
discrete investments and focus at the two extreme cases of perfect substi-
tutes or complements. A variant of the model adjusted to the setting of
decentralized health care provision is found in Bogetoft and Mikkers (2008).
5 Model
We present a formal model, drawing on the DER-DSO model in Agrell
and Bogetoft (2006), to investigate three prevalent scenarios; the full DSO-
DER integration, a decentralized DSO scenario and centralized scenario with
11
Figure 1: DER investor, DSO and regulatory organization and delegation.
parallel regulation of both DSO and DER investments (cf. Fig 1). For each
scenario, we determine optimal investment policies for the DSO and DER
owner under regulatory control or incentives. The evaluation criterion is the
generated welfare e¤ects, measured as the proportion of socially protable
investments that are undertaken.
The rst scenario, corresponding to a situation where the unbundling
requirement on the DSO is relaxed, shows the highest investment rates.
The DSO internalizes the investment and the loss of investment is due to
rationing by the regulator due to information problems.
The second scenario simplies the regulation by delegation to the DSO
to handle DER issues, but the results are characterized by lower investments
and some distortions in the providership. Hence, the simplicity comes at a
cost in this sense.
The third scenario provides the regulator with the added opportunity
to contract separately with both the DSO and the DER. This arrangement
brings several advantages for the investment incentives to limit costs, but it
is shown that the relative protability of investments at the two levels will
crucially depend on the structure of this regulation, e.g. the role of the DER
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bidin the regulation and the DSO right to initiate investments.
5.1 Investment decision
We consider a simple case with one regulator, one distribution system op-
erator (DSO) and one investor-generator in decentralized generation or dis-
tributed energy resources (called DER below). To simplify, we study an in-
vestment opportunity assumed to be unique and indivisible, e.g. the initial
investment in a technology, measurement equipment or protective device.
The DSO and the DER can both achieve the e¤ects of the investment, the
costs of which are private information to the DSO and DER respectively.
The investments are either substitutes or complements. One interpretation
coincides with the focus in Brunekreeft and Ehlers (2005) on distribution
capacity deferral, likely to be the most important direct e¤ect (Pepermans
et al., 2005). We shall now formalize in the simplest possible way without
losing key properties of the situations or the solution.
5.2 Regulator
The aim of the regulator is to maximize social welfare. In a situation where a
new socially desirable investments are possible at the DER and DSO levels,
respectively, we may assume that the extra value generated if these invest-
ments are undertaken is V > 0. This social value is known and veriable, to
abstract from the moral hazard problem of fullling investment obligations.
If the regulator as a representative for the consumers has to pay a total
transfer T as compensation to the DSO and/or the DER, e.g. by increasing
the reimbursement (revenue-cap etc) or by direct investment subsidies, the
social welfare improvement is
W = V   T
The objective of the regulator is to maximize the expected value of W .
Note that it follows from the postulated objective of the regulator that
he explicitly trades o¤ the benet derived from the costs of ensuring these.
For su¢ ciently high values of V , however, this accommodates the objective
of simply minimizing the expected costs of making the necessary DSO and
DER activities. In such cases, we are close to the implicit assumption in
much regulation, namely that demand is basically given and price inelastic
and the aim is to fulll demand at the least possible costs.
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5.3 Network operator, DSO
The network operator (DSO) can make an investment at cost5 x > 0 that
is private information to the DSO. The DER and regulator only knows that
the DSOs cost to make it simple - is independent from DERs cost, and
that it follows a probability distribution with density f(x) and cumulative
probabilities F (x):The aim of the riskneutral DSO is to maximize expected
revenue minus costs, i.e.
E [R  I (R; x)xjx]
where R is the revenue that the DSO is paid6. It may depend on his in-
vestments as well as any other possible veriable information, including the
DER investments. (We shall investigate the e¤ects of asymmetric informa-
tion not only about investment costs but also about who actually performs
it in the nal discussion). I(R; x) is the (binary) investment decision of the
DSO, one when investment is undertaken and value zero otherwise. Lastly,
we note that the expectation is a conditional one. It is the expected benets
given the private information about relevant investment costs.
5.4 Investor DER
We model the generator-investor (DER) in an analogous manner. The DER
can invest at a cost y > 0; which is private information for the DER. The
investment cost y follows a probability distribution with density g(y) and
cumulative probabilities G(y), common knowledge to all players. The DER
maximizes expected revenue less cost, i.e.
E [S   J (S; y) yjy]
where S is the revenue paid to the DER. In case of a connection charge,
S will be negative, and in case of net benets from installing the equipment,
say by the private benet exceeding the installation costs, the net costs y
5Cost is here seen as the e¤ective net real annuity of depreciation and capital cost in
an e¢ cient capital market as to avoid burdening the presentation with the consideration
of the actual investment pattern, taxation and life cycle maintenance pattern.
6The actual reimbursement scheme for the DSO through allowed tari¤s, recognized
performance in yardstick regimes, separate by-pass of investment costs or socialized trans-
fers from other gridlevels (transmission) is ignored here as only the behavioral e¤ects are
studied. Hence, we assume that the regulator enforces the same non-discriminatory nanc-
ing pattern for this particular revenue as for any other DSO revenue, i.e. no additional
distortion is introduced.
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will be negative. Denote the binary investment strategy of the DER by the
function J(:).
6 Substitute investments
To simplify the exposition and since we consider services that can be pro-
vided at either the DSO or the DER level, we will assume that the distribu-
tions of the costs x and y are independent but identically distributed. In the
case of substitute investments, the social welfare obtained is V unless none
of the DSO and DER invests, i.e. I = 0 and J = 0 then it is normalized to
zero.
Since both the DSO and the DER investor are rational, independent
and prot maximizing, investment will only take place if it is incentive com-
patible for the agents. This means that the regulator anticipates the usual
incentive compatibility constraints for the DSO and the DER, respectively:
I (R; x) = argmax

fE [R  xjx]g (1)
J (S; y) = argmax

fE [S   yjy]g (2)
Thus, both agents maximize their respective information rents with re-
spect to the regulation imposed. In addition, individual rationality (IR)
constraints must be fullled for each agent, since participation is voluntary.
The reservation utility is normalized to zero.
E [R  I (R; x)xjx]  0 (3)
E [S   J (S; y) yjy]  0 (4)
6.1 First-best solution
Before investigating the possible solutions under asymmetric information,
we observe as a benchmark the rst-best solution. This is here dened as
the solution when the regulator has perfect information about the costs of
the DSO and DER, i.e., to invest i¤
minfx; yg  V
and in this case to implement the least costly investment level, i.e. if
x = minfx; yg  V , the DSO invests, y = minfx; yg  V , the DER invests
(in cases of ties the solution can be picked arbitrary).
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Figure 2: DSO and DER investments, rst-best solution for substitutes.
The rst best solution is illustrated in Figure 2 below. We see that
investment takes place at the least costly level and that we only forgo in-
vestments in the red are where no level can make the investments at costs
below the value V .
We will now turn out attention to three scenarios regarding the organ-
zation of the network regulation; (i) integrated DSO-DER and centralized
regulation, (ii) independent DSO and DER under centralized regulation,
(iii) unbundled DSO and DER under decentralized regulation.
6.2 Integrated solution
Returning to the integrated scenario in Green (2009) or the US situation, we
consider a network regulation allowing the DSO to own and undertake the
investment. Hence, the regulator basically faces one entity with some un-
known costs z of making the investment. The integration is here dened as
the legal possibility for the DSO to undertake DER investments, including
harvesting gains from sale of energy at competitive terms. However, since
we are assuming that (i) no non-grid related operation at the DSO, (ii) no
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downstream market power in the sale of energy for the DSO, the revenues
resulting from the generation itself are normalized to zero as being compet-
itively valued at marginal cost (excluding the grid impact that is explicitly
modeled).
An integrated DSO-DER will of course make the investment at the least
costly level, i.e.
z = minfx; yg
with cumulative distribution
H(z) = ProbfZ  zg = 1  [1  F (z)][1 G(z)]
Since the regulator only knows H, not the specic z, his best strategy is
to make a take-it or leave-it o¤er to the DSO-DER entity, cf. Tirole(1988).
This is a general result from mechanism design that has many applications,
cf. e.g. Antle, Bogetoft and Stark (1999).
Let z be regulators o¤er, the regulators expected value is
E(W ) = [V   z]H(z)
Since the rst factor is the net benet when investment takes place and
the provider, the DSO-DER entity, is paid z, and the last factor is the
probability that the DSO-DER actually accepts and implements the invest-
ment.
Proposition 1 The optimal contract for the integrated case is found as the
solution z to
z = V   [H(z)=h(z)]
The result (see Figure 3) for the integrated case is a rationing z with
respect to V , reecting the tradeo¤ between welfare and the information
rents extracted by the DSO-DER. By increasing z, the improvements are
undertaken more often but they are also more costly. We see that when
investments do take place, they are implemented at the right level. The
solution is attractive except that there are some social losses due to under-
investments (white area). Naturally, the share of investments rationed away
is decreasing in the societal externality V (e.g the urgency of achieving
climate change objectives) and increasing with the uncertainty related to
the investment cost.
This underinvestment is a direct consequence of the mechanism to lower
the information rents that the DSO-DER entity can earn. We illustrate the
rationing with two examples.
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Figure 3: DSO and DER investments, integrated case, substitutes.
Example 1 Assuming that V = 1 and that z follows a uniform distribu-
tion on [0; 1], we get z = 1   z=1 or equivalently, z = 0:5. Hence, the
regulator deliberately forgoes half of the attractive investments in order to
get the other investments at lower costs. Put more generally, the desire to
share the benets with the consumers should optimally force the regulator to
forego some otherwise attractive investments at the DSO and DER levels.
Example 2 As another example, let us assume that x and y are inde-
pendent, uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. The cumulative distribution of
z = minfx; yg is therefore 1   (1   z)2 with density 2(1   z), such that
the optimal z is given by
z = V   [1  (1  z)2]=[2(1  z)]
For V = 1 we now obtain z = 0:354 as investment threshold level.
In the analysis above, we have assumed that the regulator cannot verify
which of the two investments (the DSO grid investment I or the DER site
investment J) the integrated entity undertakes - if any. If the investment
type can be veried, e.g. by access to cost accounting details, the above
solution can be improved. This situation is analyzed in details in Antle,
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Bogetoft and Stark (1999). Here we show than an optimal solution involves
the regulator setting two cost thresholds, x and y, one for each of the two
investments. The payment to the DSO will then depend on which investment
is undertaken: It is x when (I; J) = (1; 0) and y when (I; J) = (0; 1) and
0 otherwise. The corresponding investment strategy of the integrated entity
will be to pick I = 1 if x   x  y   y and x   x  0 and J = 1 if
y y > x x and y y  0, i.e. the integrated entity picks the investment
to maximize information rents (and breaks ties in favor of I here). This
solution will lead to less rationing. However, it will involve a coordination
ine¢ ciency in the sense that the investment with least costs may not be
implemented. What matter is cost compared to the thresholds. In such a
handicapping systemthe regulator would tend to favor investments that
he has better information about. If the expected values of x and y are the
same but the spread of the former is larger then the spread of the latter, the
regulator would tend to set x < y as demonstrated in Antle, Bogetoft and
Stark (1999).
6.3 Unbundled DSO and DER under decentralized regula-
tion
Assume, along the lines of the recommendations of Green (2009), Pollitt
(2009), Vogel (2008), that the DSO is unbundled from the DER investor to
assure independence. Further, along the lines of Pollitt (2009) and Green
(2009), we assume that the regulator provides a result-based target to the
DSO only, subject to direct network regulation and more informed agent
than the regulator. The subsequent negotiation with the DER to achieve
the coordination is then equivalent to a delegation of the regulation of DER
to the DSO. I.e, the regulator incentivizes the DSO and the DSO can than
decide whether to make the necessary investments or to outsource it to the
DER. Before analyzing this case, we note that one can make the usual argu-
ments for ownership unbundling (vertical separation), including the control-
lability of the DSO and the possibility to motivate it via relative performance
evaluation (benchmarking) as it is the case in modern European regulation
regimes based on revenue or price caps set partially by relative performance
assessments such as frontier e¢ ciency analyses.
In this case, the regulator can consider the DSO as the single contracting
partner. Much like in the case of integrated ownership, the DSO can be
characterized by its costs z of ensuring the new services with value V . In the
present case, and given the separate ownership, however, the distribution of
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the DSOs direct or indirect cost z will reect the internal incentive problem
between the DSO and the DER. The DSO in its relation with the DER faces
the same problems as the regulator does in its relation to the DSO.
The DSO can carry out the investment himself at a cost of x. Alterna-
tively, he can try to outsource the investment to the DER level.
As before the optimal solution is found by backwards induction. Assume
that the regulator has o¤ered z. Two situations can now be distinguished.
In the rst, the DSO has costs x > z and must therefore rely on DER to do
the investment. In the second, the DSO has costs x  z and can therefore
make a prot by doing the necessary investments itself. Still, it may reduce
costs by outsourcing if the DER has even lower costs. We shall now analyze
these cases.
The rst situation where x > z is the simplest one. The DSO has only
one possibility, namely to outsource. It o¤ers DER a payment y so as to
solve
max
y
(z   y)G(y)
Or equivalently using the rst order characterization
y = z   G(y
)
g(y)
That is, the DSO rations against the DER in same way as the regulator
rations against the DSO or the integrated DSO-DER above. Let y(z) be
the solution to this problem.
The second situation where x  z is one in which investment is certainly
going to take place, but where the DSO can possibly improve its prot
margin by the outsourcing.
Using y as a threshold towards the DER, the DSO solves for a given
threshold z
max
y
(z   x)[1 G(y)] + (z   y)[G(y)]
To see this observe that with probability [1 G(y)] the DER will decline
the investment opportunity and the DSO will rely on its own investment.
If, on the other hand, the DER undertakes an investment, which happens
with probability G(y), the DSO earns the margin between the regulators
compensation z and its own compensation to the DER, y. Let y(x; z)
be a solution to the above problem.
Proposition 2 The optimal contract for the unbundled DSO under decen-
tralized regulation is to o¤er the investment to the DER with the threshold
20
y set as the solution to
y = x  G (y
)
g(y)
Example 3 In the case of y uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and x  2, we
obtain y = x=2.
We can now summarize the DSO strategy. For x > z it outsources using
y(z) and the DER invests with probability G(y(z)). For x  z, there
is always going to be investment, either by the DER when y  y(x; z) or
otherwise by the DSO.
From the point of view of the regulator, this means that choosing z leads
to DSO or DER investment with probability F (z) + [1  F (z)]G(y(z)).
The regulator therefore chooses z to solve
max
z
(V   z)[F (z) + [1  F (z)]G(y(z))]
The solution with decentralized contracting among vertical separated
DSO and DER activities is illustrated in Figure 4 below.
We see that there is a general underinvestment as represented by the
white area. Also, we see that the DSO tends to favor its own investments
compared to DER investments. Again, this is a consequence of the rationing
in this case the DSO rations against possibly less costly DER solutions to
save information rents to the DER level. Again, this represents a social loss.
Example 4 Revisiting the previous example for uniformly distributed in-
vestment costs on [0; 1], we get that y(z) = z=2 and inserting this into the
regulators problem, we see that she will maximize (V  z)[z+(1 z)z=2]. For
V = 1, the corresponding rst order condition is a second degree polynomial,
and choosing the correct root (the left one) we get z = (8 p28)=6 ' 0:4514.
This means that the regulators trade-o¤ between the probability of invest-
ment and the price to pay is a¤ected it is now possible to lower the payment
with less risk of forgoing investment. Compare the Draconian rationing,
z = 12 , that the regulator would use if only the DSO was entitled to perform
the investment.
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Figure 4: DSO and DER investments, decentralized regulation with out-
sourcing, substitutes.
The intuition is that since the DSO has the possibility to outsource
the investment, the probability distribution of the least cost alternative is
having more mass on lower values than the uniform distribution. Indeed, if
only the DSO can provide the service, the probability of acceptance using
z is F (z) = z while with the DSO able to outsource also, the probability
of acceptance is [F (z) + [1   F (z)]G(y(z))] = z + (1   z) z2 taking into
account the optimal response of the DSO in his outsourcing activities. The
two situations are illustrated in Figure 5 below
In the analysis above, we have assumed that the regulator cannot monitor
if the investment takes place in the DSO grid or at the DER site. This is
similar to our analyses of the integrated utility. If the investment type
can be observed, and if we relax the limited liability constraint into one of
expected non-negative prots, it may be possible to improve the solution
as demonstrated in Mookherjee (2006). The idea of such an improvement
would be that the regulator could subsidize or tax the outsourcing decision
to avoid the bias towards in-house investments by the DSO. Also, a penalty
can be used to transfer the DSO information rent to the consumers. The
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Figure 5: Probabilities of acceptance of o¤ers z; P (I(z)) and P (J(z)):
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strict outsourcing requirement of connection investments for DER to DSO
grids in the Swedish network regulation is an interesting application of how
this bias is addressed by simply by-passing the DSO.
6.4 Individual centralized regulation
We now turn to an organization where the regulator centralizes the regula-
tion to both the DSO and the DER. There are two possible interpretations
of this setting. In the rst, the regulator uses unconditional regulation in
the sense that his regulation of the DSO is independent on the reaction that
his regulation has on the DER and vice versa. This is the most obvious
and probably the most natural regulation in a practical setting. It sends
clear signals to the DSO and the DER, but at the risk of double investments
(e.g.both network upgrades and the location of DER at the end of feeder
line)
The second interpretation involves conditional strategies. The regulator
may use one of the parties as the default provider and the other as an
optional provider. Thus, for example, the regulator could rst invite the
DER to do the investment and if it declines, it could turn to the DSO for
possible investments. Clearly, the latter solution has some resemblances
with the decentralized solution above. Still, it will be di¤erent as we shall
see since the regulator does not have the information about the DSO cost
that the decentralized strategies made used of.
The unconditional centralized solution requires the regulator to choose
costs targets x and y that the DSO and DER, respectively, will get covered
if they invest. The cost targets are set by the regulator to solve
max
x;y
(V   x)F (x) + (V   y)G(y)  V [F (x)G(y)]
To see this, observe that the regulator expected net benet is the value
V net of payment to the DSO if the DSO invests plus the net benet from
the DERs investments minus the value if they both invest (to balance out
the double counting of values from the rst two terms).
This problem leads to rst order conditions
x = V [1 G(y)]  [F (x)=f(x)]
y = V [1  F (x)]  [G(y)=g(y)]
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Figure 6: DSO and DER investments, centralized individual regulation,
substitutes.
We see that the rst order conditions have the same general structure as
earlier. The regulator o¤ers less than the possible value of the investment,
i.e. he rations, to save information rents. In the present setting, the starting
point is moreover not the value V but rather the discounted values V [1  
G(y)] and V [1 F (x)] respectively, i.e. it is only the value V multiplied by
the probability that the other level do not invest that counts. This reects
that the attainable value in this case since it is the value that is not already
extracted by the other level. This leads to a more severe under-investment
to lower the costs of double investments at low costs at both levels.
The solution is illustrated in Figure 6
Example 5 In the case of V = 1 and uniform costs on [0; 1], for example,
we get x = y = 1=3. Hence, the regulator rations more harshly against
the DSO and DER (using 1=3 as opposed to 1=2 in the case of possible
investment in one level only) to lower the cost of double investments. More
generally, in the case of uniform costs on [0; 1] and value V , the symmetric
solution is
x = y =
V
2 + V
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Figure 7: DSO and DER cost targets x (V ) and y (V ), centralized regula-
tion, substitutes.
The regulator will always choose to ration - if only slightly for large
values of V . This happens for the following reason: When the cost targets
are getting closer to the upper limit 1, the marginal cost of rationing is
declining since the forgone investments are most likely picked up by the
other level. Also, the marginal benets from rationing are increasing since
the double investment problem is high when the cost targets are high and
therefore the cost marginal saving in double investment costs is increasing
for larger value of the targets. The cost targets are illustrated in Figure 7.
6.5 Conditional centralized regulation
Consider next the conditional centralized solution. Let us assume that the
DER is the primary provider and that the DSO may be called upon to
invest if the DER declines. The alternative situation with the DSO being
the primary and the DER the secondary provider is similar. The conditional
centralized solution requires the regulator to choose a cost target y that is
o¤ered to the DER and cost target x that is o¤ered to the DSO if the DER
has declined y. These targets are set to solve
max
x;y
(V   y)G(y) + (V   x)F (x)[1 G(y)]
To see this, observe that the regulator expected net benet is composed
of two terms. The rst is the value V net of payment to the DER y if the
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DER invest. This happens with probability G(y). The second term is the
net benet if the DER declines and the DSO accepts. This happens with
probability [1 G(y)]F (x).
This problem leads to rst order conditions
x = V   [F (x)=f(x)]
y = V   (V   x)F (x)  [G(y)=g(y)]
We see that the rst order conditions have a structure quite similar to
the previous problems. Indeed, the optimal cost threshold for the DSO,
x, is exactly as it would be if the DSO were the only possible provider.
This is not surprising since the DSO in our setup is the secondary provider,
i.e. x is used when DER has already declined to do the investments. In
setting x, the regulator therefore faces the usual trade-o¤ of lowering the
price when investment takes place and at the same time running the risk of
no investments. The second rst order condition is also of the usual form,
except that the value to be gained is lowered by the expected gains forgone
by not using the DSO as the provider. That is, the value from having DER
do the investment is reduced by the value of the option of using the DSO as
the provider.
The solution is illustrated in Figure 8 below.
Example 6 In the case of cost uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and value V
(at the most 2), the optimal solutions are x = V=2 and y = (3=8)V:
It may seem counter intuitive that we are willing to pay more for the
DSO investment that for the identical DER investment. However, this is a
consequence of the rent-saving exercise. If the same opportunity is o¤ered to
both providers, the only role of the secondary provider would be to increase
the investment probability. In the optimal solution, the secondary provider
is also used as a competitor against the primary provider.
Proposition 3 The conditional solution is always weakly superior to the
unconditional solution.
The see this, simply observe that the unconditional solution is also fea-
sible in the conditional case  it is just not optimal. The disadvantage of
the conditional approach from a practical perspective, however, is that it
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Figure 8: DSO and DER investments, centralized conditional regulation,
substitutes.
takes more time using a sequential two-stage approach rather than a simply
single-stage approach. Also, this would make investment planning in the
DSO more di¢ cult since it cannot plan an investment based on its own cost
alone it must await the response of the DER.
The conditional approach can be rened into a series of conditional o¤er:
First, DER gets an o¤er of a relatively low cost target. If DER declines,
the DSO gets an o¤er of a slightly higher cost target. If it declines, a new
and higher o¤er is made to the DER and so on. Such sequential or parallel
bargaining can lower the rents to the DER and DSO levels, but it would run
into more serious practical problems of time needed and investment planning
as discussed above. For this reason, we shall not expand on it.
7 Complementary investments
In the case of complements, the welfare e¤ect V is obtained i¤ both agents
invest, i.e. I = 1 and J = 1; else the outcome is normalized to zero. The
case could be illustrated by the coordination of smart meters, smart grids
and demand side management (DSM) for e.g. automated load control. In-
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Figure 9: Investments for DER and DSO, rst-best solution for comple-
ments.
stalling the DSM without meters does not exploit the externalities and the
information about grid usage and real time prices, providing real-time infor-
mation about grid usage and nodal prices in distribution networks without
any application is useless.
The rst-best solution is simply dened by the condition
x+ y  V
The investment outcome is illustrated in Figure 9 below, the undertaken
investment is in the dark grey area, the lighter grey area are socially costly
investments that are rejected.
7.1 Integrated DSO-DER: centralized solution
If the DSO and the DER are integrated (or there is no asymmetry of infor-
mation between the two), the total cost of the integrated entity will be
z = x+ y
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with cumulative distribution
H(z) = ProbfZ  zg =
Z z
0
G(z   x)f(x)dx
As in the case of substitutes, the best strategy for the regulator is to make
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the integrated entity. If the regulator o¤ers z
to the integrated entity, the expected value for the regulator is similar to
the case of substitutes
E(W ) = [V   z]H(z)
Proposition 4 The optimal regulatory contract for the integrated central-
ized case with complementary investment is an o¤er z found from
z = V   [H(z)=h(z)]
The regulator rations, i.e. he o¤ers less the true value of the investment
V . Her o¤er reects the trade-o¤ between lowering the information rents of
the integrated entity and the probability of not having the investment at all.
The investment outcome is illustrated in Figure 10, where the white area
denotes coordination losses, i.e. socially optimal investments that are not
undertaken due to rationing.
Example 7 For the case V = 1 and x; y following uniform distributions on
[0; 1], we get H (z) = z
2
2 for z  1 and H (z) = 1  (2 z)
2
2 for z in [1; 2]. The
optimal investment threshold is z = 23 , i.e. investments take place only with
probability 29 whereas
1
2 of the investments are socially desireable. Hence, the
welfare loss corresponds to 59 ' 56% of the rst-best investments.
7.2 Decentralized regulation
In the case of decentralized regulation, the regulator o¤ers z to the DSO for
the combined investment. If x > z, no investment can take place. If x  z,
the DSO can make an o¤er y to the DER investor. With probability G(y),
the DER will accept the o¤er. Therefore the DSO obtains y from solving
max
y
((z   x)  y)G(y)
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Figure 10: DSO and DER investments, integrated case, complements.
With rst order condition for an inner optimum is
y = (z   x)  [G(y)=g(y)]
From the point of view of the regulator, this means that the regulators
o¤er z leads to DSO and DER investment only if both conditions x  z
and y  y(z   x) hold. The rst condition is satised with probability
F (z) and, for any given x, the second condition is satised with probability
G(y(z   x)) by the independence of x and y. Therefore, the investment
occurs with probability
H (z) =
Z z
0
G (y (z   x)) f (x) dx
Proposition 5 The optimal regulatory contract for the integrated decentral-
ized case with complementary investments is
z = V   [H(z)=h(z)]
The investment outcome is illustrated in Figure 11 below.
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Figure 11: DSO and DER investments, decentralized case, complements.
Example 8 For the case V = 1 and x; y following uniform distributions
on [0; 1], we get y = 12 (z   x) and thus H (z) = z
2
4 for z  1. The optimal
investment threshold is z = 23 , i.e. investments take place only with proba-
bility 19 . The social loss corresponds to
7
9 ' 78% of the rst-best investments.
The negative outcomes above for complements are robust also to the
introduction of an optimal full revelation mechanism of the Myerson (1979)
type, since the competition among the agents is not e¤ective when the par-
ticipation of both agents is necessary.
7.3 Individual centralized solution
In the individual centralized solution, the regulator makes o¤ers x for the
DSO and y for the DER as the solution to the problem
max
x;y
f(V   x  y)G(y)F (x)  xF (x)[1 G(y)]  yG(y)[1  F (x)]g
The rst term represents the gain if both the DSO and DER accept
the o¤er of the regulator. The second term represents the loss if the DER
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declines and the DSO accepts. This happens with probability [1 G(y)]F (x).
The third term represents the cost if the DER accepts and the DSO rejects
the contract.
Di¤erentiation w.r.t x gives us the following rst order condition
G(y)[ F (x)+(V x y)f(x)] [xf(x)+F (x)][1 G(y)]+yG(y)f(x) = 0
From this we get
y = G 1

xf(x) + F (x)
V f(x)

By symmetry, we get
x = F 1

yg(y) +G(y)
V g(y)

Similar to the case of substitutes, the regulator rations to lower infor-
mation rents, while he rations more than in the integrated solution to lower
the loss of only one party investing. The solution can be illustrated as in
Figure 12 below.
Example 9 For the case of x; y following uniform distributions on [0; 1],
the FOC of the objective function are V y   2x and V x   2y, respectively.
Thus, for V = 1; optimal solution is x = y = 0. The social loss cor-
responds to 100% of the rst-best investments! For V = 2; the solution is
arbitrary for any x = y in [0; 1] and for V > 2 all investments are carried
out.
The intuition behind the result for the individual centralized regulation
lies in the unilateral commitment from the regulator to nance the invest-
ment irrespective of the coordination in the chain.
7.4 Conditional centralized solution
To illustrate the possibility to get intermediate outcomes between those
of full revelation and the individual regulation we may again consider an
example of conditional regulation. One possibility in direct line with the
case of substitutes is to o¤er the investment possibility to the DER investor
and if he accepts and undertakes the investment, to o¤er the investment also
33
Figure 12: DSO and DER investments, centralized individual regulation,
complements.
to the DSO. The advantage of this arrangement compared to the individual
regulations above is that we can avoid having the DSO invest without the
DER investing. We can however not avoid that the DER invests but the
DSO refuses to do so as well. The outcome following such an arrangement
will therefore often be that the regulator should refrain from any investments
to begin with much like in the case of individual regulation.
To get a di¤erent outcome, therefore, we will here assume that the reg-
ulator can make conditional regulations in the following sense: She o¤ers
(simultaneously) a separate contract to both the DSO and the DER. An
accepted contract by one party is only valid if the other party also accepted
his contract. Therefore, in the unconditional centralized solution, the losses
due to acceptance by only one party do not occur.
The regulator therefore solves:
max
x;y
fy(V   x  y)G(y)F (x)g
with corresponding rst order conditions
x + y = V   F (x
)
f(x)
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Figure 13: DSO and DER investments, centralized conditional regulation,
complements.
x + y = V   G(y
)
g(y)
This solution is illustrated in Figure 13 below.
Example 10 For the case of V = 1 and x; y following uniform distributions
on [0; 1], we obtain x = y = 13 : Investments take place with probability
1
9
as in the decentralized regulation. The social loss corresponds to 79 ' 78%
of the rst-best investments.
The intuition for the equivalence between the conditional centralized
regime and the decentralized regulation is also found more generally in
Melumad et al. (1995), where delegated contracting like our scheme repli-
cates the second-best solution obtained through centralized contracting.
Moreover, Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1998) explore the properties
of the delegated contracting when side-payments and collusive agreements
between agents are possible. E¤ectively, when the possibility of collusive
behavior is independent of contractual organization, the two regimes are
equivalent also under moral hazard.
35
Table 1: Outcomes, uniform example, substitutes
Regulation x P (I; J) E (W ) Rationing Misallocation Double invest
First-best   1:000 0:667 No No No
Integrated 0:354 0:583 0:376 Yes No No
Centralized 0:500 0:750 0:417 Yes No No
Decentralized 0:451 0:575 0:316 Yes Yes No
Centralized individual 0:333 0:556 0:333 Yes No Yes
Table 2: Outcomes, uniform example, complements
Regulation x P (I; J) E (W ) Rationing Misallocation Double invest
First-best   0:500 0:167 No No No
Integrated 0:667 0:222 0:074 Yes No No
Centralized 0:667 0:222 0:074 Yes No No
Decentralized 0:667 0:111 0:037 Yes Yes No
Centralized individual 0:000 0:000 0:000 Yes Yes Yes
8 Conclusion
To summarize the ndings, we table the outcome for the case of uniform
costs [0; 1] and welfare V = 1, the situation for substitutes in Table 1 and
for complements in Table 2, respectively.
In the case of substitutes, the centralized solution is the preferred op-
tion as it avoids misallocations (i.e., lowest cost investment is implemented)
and does not involve useless duplicated investments. There is still losses
associated with the outcome, namely due to the rationing. Rationing in the
sense that not all investments with cost below the value to the consumers
are undertaken is part of the solution since it enable the regulator acting as
a substitute consumer to lower the information rents he has to pay.
For complements, the same nding as above for substitutes is relevant.
A centralized regulation can here replicate the second-best solution obtained
from an integrated DSO internalizing all e¤ects.
If  for reasons that may go beyond the scope of the model  the two
levels are separated (unbundled), we can foresee two possible organizations
of the regulation. In the rst, the regulator contracts with the DSO that has
the option to outsource the investments. In the other, the DSO and DER
are contracted individually by the regulator.
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The best separated outcome is the rst one, i.e. it involves decentralized
regulation: only the DSO is contracted directly and the possible regulation
of DER is delegated to the DSO. The advantage of this approach of having
decentralized regulation of DER is that the DSO has private information
about its own costs and that it can use this information when deciding how
to incentivize DER. Nevertheless, this setting leads to less overall investment
at a higher cost to the consumers. Two types of ine¢ ciencies are present,
namely rationing and some misallocation of investment among the two levels.
The DSO favors its own investments since outsourcing generates costs of
asymmetric information.
When the regulator contracts directly with both levels, the outcome is
less e¢ cient there will be rationing and double investments, i.e. in some
cases, the DER and DSO levels will both end up investing even though this
is unattractive since the investments are substitutes. This can be partly
circumvented if the regulator uses conditional regulation such that the o¤er
to one level depends on the response of the other level. The latter however
may be a di¢ cult approach in practice since it requires time to rst o¤er
the investment to a primary provider and next to a secondary provider if
the primary provider declines.
In short, therefore, from the point of view of substitute investments, the
regulator will prefer an integration of the DSO and DER activities and if
this is not possible, it would prefer a regulation of one of the levels leaving
the control of the other to the directly regulated level.
Of course, this ranking of the di¤erent organizational and regulatory so-
lutions may conict with other objectives that we have ignored, including
the need to incentivize cost reductions at the DSO level in general via rel-
ative performance evaluations like in a high powered revenue cap (CPI-X)
regulation.
Taking the broader perspective, we provide two policy results, for the
design of future incentive network regulation and for the organization of
network services, respectively.
First, the results show that in the presence of increased importance for
discrete delegated investments with high asymmetric information, the op-
timal regulation of future network services should remain a high-powered
incentive regulation with an inclusion of the investment driver as part of
the service description of the DSO. An example of where this is used in
yardstick design for electricity DSO is Bundesnetzagentur in Germany, cf.
Agrell and Bogetoft (2007). The DEA frontier model specication used in
the regulation includes variables for the subscribed capacity for decentralized
generation into the network, divided by voltage level, as cost drivers.
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Second, the network regulation should if possible be centralized to one
agent with veriable investments and no delegated or conditional rights.
This means that the "negotiated agreements" are likely not a long-term so-
lution for the network regulation in the future. This result can be directly
compared to that of Joskow and Tirole (2005, section 5) where the question
of merchant investments in transmission can be delegated to the contracting
parties, in their case two potential investors. For both complementary and
substitute investments, the authors reject the applicability of the Coasian
theorem (unless mitigated by long-term contracting) since a number of as-
sumptions are not fullled; (low) transaction costs, complete information,
presence of all stakeholders, absence of free-riding, absence of hold-up of
potential losers. In the current situation, we note that several of these
conditions are violated also in the case of the local DSO-DER bargaining.
The DSO is naturally in informational advantage, there are high transac-
tion costs involved to adequately describe and contract on the externalities
involved on and o¤ the grid, the future grid users are not represented at the
negotiation although likely to assume the investment if made by the DSO,
future investors in generation can free-ride on infrastructure in e.g. control
equipment and protection etc.
Finally, it should be noted that the discussion and the model is oriented
to a specic policy issue: the provision of investment incentives for CAPEX
increases in order to accomodate and fully utilize future low-carbon energy
resources. This is made without neglecting the importance of assuring the
development of technologies for the future energy system, including the po-
tential establishment of CCS installations and networks that in themselves
may give rise to questions of network regulation that do not share these
properties.
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